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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Lonnie Hust appeals from the district court's Order of Dismissal regarding his
Petition for Post Conviction Relief. Mr. Hust asserts that the district court erred by
dismissing his Petition prior to ruling on his motion for appointment of counsel and
without appointing counsel to assist Mr. Hust in the post-conviction proceeding. This
Reply Brief will focus only on the State's assertions that Mr. Hust waived any challenge
to the district court's failure to address his motion for appointment of counsel and that
the district court is not required to address a motion for appointment of counsel when a
petition for post-conviction relief is untimely on its face.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings were previously
articulated in

Mr. Hust's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply

Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.

ISSUE
Did the district court err by summarily dismissing Mr. Hust's post-conviction petition prior
to ruling on his request for counsel and by failing to appoint counsel to assist him in the
post conviction proceedings?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred Bv Dismissing Mr. Hust's Post-Conviction Petition Prior To
Rulina On His Request For Counsel And Erred By Failinq To Appoint Counsel To Assist
Mr. Hust
A.

Mr. Hust Did Not Waive His Ability To Challenqe The District Court's Failure To
Address His Motion For Appointment Of Counsel
The State asserts that Mr. Hust waived his right to challenge the district court's

failure to address his motion for appointment of counsel by stating that "Petitioner is
requesting Counsel to assist him in perfecting his First Direct Appeal, not this postconviction relief petition." (Respondent's Brief, pp.4-5; R., p.19.) Mr. Hust filed his
Petition on December 14, 2007, and also filed a Motion and Affidavit in Support for
Appointment of Counsel that same day. (R., pp.3-7; Augmentation: Motion and Affidavit
in Support for Appointment of Counsel.)

In his Response to State's Motion to Dismiss,

Mr. Hust again reiterated that he was requesting counsel to assist him. (R., p.14.)
Mr. Hust again asked that the district court address his appointment of counsel request
when he filed a Motion and Request for Stay on State's Motion to Dismiss, requesting
that the district court "put a stay on States Motion to Dismiss, until court grants petitioner
request for counsel." (R., p.16.)
Mr. Hust then filed a Response to Notice of Intent to Dismiss addressing only the
merits of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

(R., pp.18-20.)

It is in this

response, which appears nearly identical in form and substance to his Response to
State's Motion to Dismiss, that Mr. Hust made the statement about requesting counsel
for his appeal. (R., p.19.) Mr. Hust asserts that this was either a typographical error,
which he, acting pro se, forgot to correct as it had been corrected in his earlier, nearly

identical filing, or was the result of a lack of understand as to the remedy he was
requesting in his post-conviction, i.e., that he be able to file his an appeal addressing his
original judgment and be appointed an attorney to handle his appeal.

The

overwhelming number of requests for appointment of counsel suggest that it was not his
intention to abandon these requests, but instead a mistake made by a pro se petitioner.
Because he was acting pro se, Mr. Hust requests that this Court find that his statement
was made in error, that he continued to assert his request for appointment of counsel,
and, as such, did not waive the argument on appeal.
B.

The District Court Is Reauired To Address A Motion For A~pointmentOf Counsel
When A Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Is Untimelv On Its Face
In claiming that Mr. Hust's petition was "frivolous," the State's focus on the

alleged violation of the statute of limitations has incorrectly placed the proverbial cart
before the horse. The State asks this Court to hold that a petitioner can be denied
counsel and the post-conviction action dismissed if, based upon the face of the petition,
the petition appears untimely. (Respondent's Brief, pp.9-12.)
Unfortunately, the tolling issue was never addressed by the district court, nor was
it specifically addressed by Mr. Hust in his pro se response, which of course is not
surprising because the district court's Notice of Intent to Dismiss merely concludes that
Mr. Hust's Petition is untimely, without analyzing any possible exceptions or informing
him that equitable tolling is a potential exception to the timeliness requirement. Thus, a
pro se petitioner with possible physical, mental, and/or educational limitations as
compared to a licensed attorney, would have no reason to raise or understand a
technical legal argument such as equitable tolling. Despite the obvious deference given

to allegations in a post conviction action by a pro se petitioner, as repeatedly recognized
ldaho Courts, the State implies that Mr. Hust failed to raise facts sufficient to show that
appointed counsel would be able to present a valid argument for equitable tolling of the
limitations period and, as such, the dismissal of his petition is proper. This argument is
flawed because Mr. Hust was not required to assert facts supporting a claim of tolling
the statue of limitations and because requiring a pro se petitioner to undersiand the
elements of a tolling claim places an unreasonable burden upon him.
1.

Mr. Hust Was Not Required To Assert Facts Supportina A Claim Of Tolling
The Statute Of Limitations In His Petition For Post Conviction Relief

An assertion of facts supporting a claim of tolling of the statute of limitations "is
not an element of a claim for post-conviction relief; it is a response to the State's
affirmative defense that the claim is time barred." Anderson v. State, 133 Idaho 788,
792, 992 P.2d 783, 787 (1999). Thus, it is not necessary for a post-conviction petitioner
to include allegations about tolling in the petition. Id. "To hold otherwise would require
inmates, who are untrained in the law and are generally acting without the benefit of
counsel in the preparation of their applications, to anticipate possible affirmative
defenses and negate them even before the affirmative defense has been pleaded." Id.
Because a petitioner need not anticipate the affirmative defenses that may or
may not be asserted in his case and, thus, need not negate the affirmative defense of a
violation of the statute of limitation in the initial petition, a petitioner should not be denied
counsel and his petition dismissed for failure to do these things.

Demanding such

action on the part of a pro se petitioner would require him not only to anticipate possible
defenses, but also to know what the essential elements of a tolling claim are. Idaho's

appellate courts have recognized that this is an unreasonable burden to place on pro se
petitioners. Anderson, 133 ldaho at 792, 992 P.2d at 787; Charboneau v. State, 140
ldaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, I 1 11 (2004). Thus, the denial of counsel and a
dismissal based upon a finding that the petition appears to be time-barred is premature
and reversible error.
2.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Failinq To Appoint Counsel To
Assist Mr. Hust Because He Presented The Possibility Of A Valid Claim
And , As A Pro Se Petitioner, Was Likely Unable To Satisfv The Dauntinq
Burden Of Presentinq An Equitable Tollinq Argument

In the present case, the application of the legal analysis applicable to requests
for the appointment of counsel shows that the district court committed reversible error
when it failed to appoint counsel for Mr. Hust. As the ldaho Supreme Court has
repeatedly recognized, when considering whether to appoint counsel in a postconviction case.
the trial court should keep in mind that petitions and affidavits filed by a
pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and incomplete. Although facts
sufficient to state a claim may not be alleged because they do not exist,
they also may not be alleged because the pro se petitioner simply does
not know what are the essential elements of a claim.
Charboneau, 140 ldaho at 792, 102 P.3d at 1111; see also Swader v. State, 143 ldaho
651, 653, 152 P.3d 12, 15 (2007) (stating "In Brown v. Sfafe, 135 ldaho 676, 23 P.3d
138 (2001), we noted that a pro se petitioner may fail to allege sufficient facts to state a
claim for post-conviction relief simply because he or she does not know the essential
elements of the claim.").

In addition, the trial courts must consider "whether

circumstances prevent the petitioner from making a more thorough investigation into the
facts," such as when the petitioner is incarcerated, and whether presentation of a claim

will "require the assistance of someone trained in the law," such as when a petitioner
must show "that his or her counsel's performance was deficient or that such deficiency
prejudiced the defense." Swader, 143 ldaho at 655, 152 P.3d at 16.

Thus, "the trial

court should appoint counsel if the petition alleges facts showing the possibility of a
valid claim such that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to
retain counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claim." Swader, 143 ldaho at
655, 152 P.3d at 16 (emphasis added).
Mr. Hust alleged facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a
further investigation into his claims. In addition, it should be noted that Mr. Hust's claim
related to his receiving ineffective assistance of counsel. This claim will "require the
assistance of someone trained in the law," as Mr. Hust must show "that his or her
counsel's performance was deficient [and] that such deficiency prejudiced the defense."
Swader, 143 ldaho at 655,152 P.3d at 16.
In the instant case, the district court found that Mr. Hust's Petition was untimely
because it was filed more than a year after the time period during which he could have
appealed the district court's order revoking his probation. (See R., pp.10-12, 26.) ldaho
Code § 19-4902 provides: "An application [for Post-Conviction reliefj may be filed at
any time within one (1) year from the expiration from the time for appeal or from the
determination of an appeal or from the determination from a proceeding following an
appeal, whichever is later." I.C. Ij 19-4902. The ldaho Court of Appeals has recognized
that a petitioner who files a post-conviction application within the limitations period
relevant to a post judgment motion, but beyond the limitations period relevant to the

judgment of conviction, may address those issues that arose from the post judgment
motion, or the proceedings leading up to it. See Gonzalez v. State, 139 ldaho 384, 79
P.3d 743 (Ct. App. 2003).
Mr. Hust concedes that his Petition was not filed within a year and 42 days from
the district court's order imposing sentence. However, had counsel been appointed to
represent Mr. Hust with his post-conviction action, he possibly could have produced
sufficient evidence to toll the statute of limitations. In Idaho, equitable tolling of the
statute of limitations for the filing of a petition for post conviction relief has been
recognized: "(1) where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility on an
in-state conviction without legal representation or access to ldaho legal materials;
(2) and where mental disease andlor psychotropic medication renders a petitioner
incompetent and prevents petitioner from earlier pursuing challenges to his convictions."
Sayas v. State, 139 ldaho 957, 960,88 P.3d 776, 780 (Ct. App. 2003).
Recognizing that he was unable to properly respond to the Notice of Intent to
Dismiss, Mr. Hust requested that his case be stayed until counsel was appointed and
again requested appointment of counsel. (R., pp.13-17.) Mr. Hust concedes that he did
not provide any information regarding equitable tolling in his response. Yet, requiring
him to do so would require him not only to anticipate possible defenses, but also to
know what the essential elements of a tolling claim are, placing an unreasonable burden
on pro se petitioners. Anderson, 133 ldaho at 792, 992 P.2d at 787. Instead, he did all
that he was capable of, again requesting counsel be appointed to assist him.
The State has merely speculated that Mr. Hust would never be able to establish
a valid equitable tolling claim; however, with the assistance of counsel, as repeatedly

requested, such a claim may have been successfully presented to the court.
Accordingly, because Mr. Hust raised the possibility of a valid claim, which upon the
investigation of counsel may include the possibility of a valid equitable tolling exception
to the time limit, his case should be remanded to the district court with instructions that
counsel be appointed to guide him through the complex post conviction proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Hust respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order
summarily dismissing his Petition and remand his case so that he may be appointed
counsel to proceed with this post-conviction action.
DATED this lothday of March, 2009.
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